

Opening of the conference

Dr. Kai M. Schellhorn

On behalf of the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt, I may welcome you warmly to our Round-Table Workshop »Hans J. Morgenthau – The Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism.« I may add a very special welcome to Ms. Susanna Morgenthau who came from New York City. Thank you very much for joining us here. And a special welcome to our patron Prof. Dr. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann. Thank you for joining us here too.

Due to the celebration of Hans Morgenthau's 100th birthday it is my great pleasure that we could gather such an outstanding group of scholars who in one way or the other are affiliated with political Realism. This academic school of thought which was founded by Hans J. Morgenthau who relied heavily on ideas of Reinhold Niebuhr became a success story, even in the practice of international politics. I only want to mention Henry Kissinger who is the best example. I am looking forward to very interesting discussions on the state of the art and the future of political realism.

Let me express my deep gratitude to Prof. Kindermann and Prof. Christian Hacke who both cooperated with the Foundation intensively to make this conference possible. A word of thanks too to the Robert Bosch Foundation which co-sponsored this event. Mr. Theiner, thank you very much. And another word of thanks to all staffers who did a very good job in preparing this conference. Thank you all for joining us here in Munich.

Prof. Dr. Christian Hacke

We come together to celebrate the hundredth birthday of Hans Morgenthau and Morgenthau probably is the greatest realist figure in the early 20th century, but his roots go deeper.

We will essentially focus on three aspects of his personal life and achievements. First his role as the founder of International Theory and the founder of Political Realism. We will trace his European and his American roots and especially his German roots. But the roots of all Realists go much deeper, they go back to ancient Greece, also Morgenthau's. It was the Sophists, in opposition to Plato where everything started, the controversy between Idealism and Realism.

The second characteristic trait of Morgenthau is the practical and critical realist looking at contemporary International Relations. And with Morgenthau you see that it is not the eye of a Ranke who follows governments uncritically but it's rather a very critical eye towards contemporary crises: Morgenthau and Vietnam. We will see how his heirs dealt with crises of contemporary international relations, such as the Iraq war.

The third characteristic refers to a tragic connotation – his relationship to Germany, not just his relationship to Germany with regard to the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, but his relationship as founder of International Realism towards the Federal Republic. When you take a look at academic life in Germany, at the development of International Relations Theory in the Federal Republic since the very beginning of the 50s, through the 60s, until today, Hans J. Morgenthau and his Realism still is an outcast. Why is Morgenthau in high esteem all over the world from Chicago to Singapore, from Switzerland to South America, and especially China now, but disregarded in contemporary Germany?

Realism was neglected in Germany with one exception. It was Professor Kindermann in the 1960s who with his book and his great preface re-introduced Morgenthau in Germany. And then his Munich school made him the heir of German Realism.

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann
In Memoriam Hans. J. Morgenthau
The Man And His Message

We have gathered here in memory of Hans Joachim Morgenthau the most eminent theoretician and analyst of international politics in the twentieth century. We shall also point to the fact that his trail-blazing achievement has not only continued to inspire new, innovative approaches in his direction of theory, but is also continuing to provide effective guidance for the comprehension and analysis of current world affairs. Basing his system of thought on historical anthropology, he was able to provide key elements of his thought with the quality of time-transcending validity. In that sense he has become a classical author of our discipline. One of his students, Henry Kissinger, has justly said of him regardless of differences¹ of opinion on single issues, all of us who taught international politics after him, had to proceed from his basic premises, while Stanley Hoffmann saw in him the »founding father« of the international relations discipline.

Having been privileged to have been his student and assistant for a number of years and having kept contact with him until one year before his death in 1980, I would like to recall some of my personal encounters with him:

I first met Hans Morgenthau in 1951 when he came to my home-city Vienna with an assignment entrusted to him by George F. Kennan, then Director of the Department of State's new Policy Planning Staff. I was then chairman of the Foreign Policy Association in Vienna whose members were mostly students or young professionals interested in international affairs. Since Political Science was not taught at Austrian universities during the country's four-power-occupation, I endeavored to invite foreign and Austrian foreign affairs experts for lectures and symposia at our association. Having only a very vague knowledge of Morgenthau, I invited him for a lecture on American foreign policy. Those lectures were solemn affairs, taking place in one of Vienna's splendid baroque palaces with pieces of classical chamber music played by student orchestras before and after each lecture.

I felt that Morgenthau was deeply moved by his first return to Europe which he had left 13 years ago at the age of 33. After years of having initially lived in America in conditions of austere and even spartan environments and

1 Kissinger, Henry A.: A Gentle Analyst of Power – Hans Morgenthau, in: *The New Republic*, August 2 and 9 1980, pp. 12–14. Hoffmann, Stanley: *An American Social Science : International Relations*, in: *Daedalus*, Summer 1977, p. 44.

living at that time in Chicago, he suddenly found himself in one of Europe's most beautiful capitals where the streets were not dominated by business and advertisement but by monuments, each manifesting phases of history as well as diverse styles of classical art. This aesthetic dimension of Vienna's life style immensely appealed to his own profoundly European taste. Morgenthau, at that time 47 years old, with a searching and sometimes skeptical expression of his eyes and scars from student saber duels on his face, outwardly appeared to me to resemble the typical central European Ordinarius. Like Kissinger, he spoke English with a slightly Frankonian intonation.

His lecture was fascinating and when we met again the following day he said: »This morning when opening the newspaper, I was really impressed by a most reasonable article on American foreign policy until I discovered that it was a summary of my lecture yesterday.« This was quite characteristic of his dry sense of humor. Morgenthau was interested to hear from me that in 1950 I had had the chance to work during the first three months of the Korean War as a student volunteer and »assistant press officer« at the United Nations Security Council at Lake Success, New York. He gave me a copy of his just published book »In Defense of the National Interest« and a draft-proposal for establishing at the University of Chicago a new Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy.

When I joined that Center at his invitation in Autumn of 1951, I found there impressive senior colleagues, headed by Kenneth Thompson and including for instance also Robert Osgood and Tang Tsou.

Morgenthau, at that time, formed one of the central figures in nationwide intensive debates and controversies on the nature of American foreign policy and world affairs. Many American citizens understandably were asking themselves in confusion why, after the sacrifices of a second American participation in a World War supposed to be another crusade for freedom and justice, half of the European continent as well as China, the center of East Asia, had nevertheless fallen into the hands of totalitarian adversaries of the United States. Five years after »V-Day«, America found itself at war again, this time against China and North-Korea, a country where MacArthur's mostly American UN-troops had just suffered from a crushing defeat by suddenly intervening Chinese armies. The advantage of America's nuclear monopoly had been lost since 1949 and the Berlin crisis of 1948 had moved the world close to the brink of a Third World War.

All of this raised agonizing questions that cried out for answers and demagogues like Senator Joe MacCarthy claimed that America had been victimized by widespread conspiracy and subversion among government and public opinion leaders.

Faced with this confusion, Morgenthau assumed the role of a »Preceptor Americae« who – quite daring for an immigrant – sharply criticized America's postwar policies as having been built upon a world-view and codes of

conduct that were basically wrong. World politics and foreign policy did not consist of conflicting ideologies, were therefore not a simple struggle between good and evil, and could not effectively be dealt with merely by legal rules and institutions.

No, in order to understand the very nature of politics and the perennial role of men as its actors one had to comprehend that striving for power and pursuing power-related interests were the dynamic primary sources of causation in political action and inter-action, no matter how much this causation might be disguised by all kinds of other motives or by genuine self-delusion.

Serving the nation responsibly in the conduct of foreign policy therefore required a realistic comprehension, definition, and pursuit of its interests in a global sphere of inter-actions, essentially characterized by a multitude of power relations to be explained in terms of competing or converging interests.

Morgenthau warned against what he called a »military displacement of politics« as well as against the misuse of religion for the purpose of disguising factual power interests.² In foreign policy he demanded a commanding role of a flexible type of diplomacy that is »the leader of public opinion, not its slave« and that is capable of correctly assessing and manipulating concrete interests and power potentials of its own nation as well as of others.³

This radical novelty of Morgenthau's views within the context of American society provoked sharp contradictions from among all sorts of Liberals, Marxists, Institutionalists and Nationalists who accused him of seeking to propagate a cynical type of European Machiavellism that contradicted the ideal self-image of the United States and its noble aspirations of creating a new and better world order.

But never intimidated, Morgenthau fought back with an uncompromising ardor, forceful distinctness and hard hitting rebuttals. It was truly impressive to watch him in the course of public disputes with his adversaries. Morgenthau's almost missionary ardor stemmed from his deeply felt conviction that he was in possession of the key element of truth concerning the nature of man and thus of politics.

In his own words the »primary moral commitment« of the Political Scientist is not to society but to the truth – meaning thereby the factor of power and all of its implications – and hence his commitment was to society »only in so far as it lives up to the truth.«⁴ Many of Morgenthau's critics over-

2 Morgenthau, Hans J.: »The Military Displacement of Politics«, in: *Dilemmas of Politics*. Chicago 1958, pp. 256–269.

3 Morgenthau Hans J.: *Politics Among Nations*. 3rd. ed. New York 1962, pp. 567–568.

4 Morgenthau, Hans J. »The Commitments of Political Science«, in: *Dilemmas of Politics*, op. cit. p.43.

looked that he did not conceal but that he rather stressed the fact that – due to the moral imperfectability of men – the exercise of power often implied elements of corruption, injustice and suppression. He often liked to quote a passage from one of the Dead Sea scrolls that poses the questions:

»What nation likes to be oppressed by a stronger power? Or who wants his property plundered unjustly? Yet, is there any single nation that has not oppressed its neighbour? Or where in the world will you find a people that has not plundered the property of another? Where indeed?«⁵

About five years after having left the United States, I met Morgenthau again in Germany when a German-language edition of the second American edition of his major work *Politics Among Nations* was to be prepared. Although I had organized for him a highly competent team of interpreters, Morgenthau asked me to discuss with him, throughout the volume, certain terms and passages that were important to him and where he wanted to avoid any misunderstanding. It was for me a fascinating and most rewarding experience. I finally wrote a synoptic introduction to the German language edition endeavoring to summarize key aspects of classical Realism.⁶ The contents met with his full approval.

At the time of our next meeting at an international conference in Salzburg in 1968 the Soviet Union suddenly invaded neighboring Czechoslovakia. Morgenthau saw in Moscow's action a symptom of weakness and a step that would further accentuate tensions and divisions among the world's Communist parties. When Morgenthau visited me about five years later, he appreciated that I, as one of his students, had been put in charge of the first West German chair for International Politics established at the University of Munich.

On the basis of some teaching experience and the additional experience of seeking to apply Realist theory while writing a history of Far Eastern international relations, I was able to engage Morgenthau in detailed discussions, in which I was actively joined by Dr. Schellhorn, on problems emerging from the application of his theory.

After some further deliberation with my associates, I decided in subsequent months to establish a system of theory and methodology which we called the »Munich School of Neorealism in International Politics.«⁷ »Realism« because we intended to extend rather than to contradict classical Real-

5 Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nations*, op. cit. pp. 34–35.

6 Morgenthau, Hans. J. : *Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der Internationalen Politik*. Introduction (Einleitung) by Gottfried-Karl Kindermann. Gütersloh 1963.

7 Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl, et al.: *Grundelemente der Weltpolitik (Fundamentals of World Politics)* 3rd. enlarged ed. Munich 1986. Introduction by Hans J. Morgenthau.

ism, but »Neo« because we did not dare to simply claim the legitimacy of classical Realism for our new approaches.

One basic deviation consisted in not choosing »interest defined as power« as our key concept but rather »politics« (Politik) defined as »Entscheidungshandeln« freely translated as »decision-oriented acting in public domestic and foreign affairs«.

In order to be able to analyze either the foreign policy of single states or processes of multilateral interaction – in other words international politics – we developed a system of inquiry called »Konstellationsanalyse« or »constellation (configuration) analysis.«⁸ This system is based upon six inter-related double-categories of inquiry.

Their operationalization has the purpose of leading to the explanation of foreign policy behavior by single states or by several states interacting within the framework of a given constellation of international politics. The term »constellation« denotes a problem-oriented interaction process between states or other action-systems at a given moment in history.

The first category called »system and decision« examines the domestic or internal determinants of foreign policy action, a most important element of causation that is missing in Morgenthau's approach although domestic processes and systems of government, for instance, determine the choice of political leadership of states or other political systems. Decision-makers continuously have to reconcile their reactions to chances and demands emerging from domestic as well as from international events and developments .

The second category »perception and reality« deals with causes and contents of subjectivity in the worldview, self-image, and situation-definitions of foreign policy decision makers, including their perceptions of other nations that may , for instance, be influenced by past foreign policy experiences of their own respective country.

A third category called »interest and power« focuses on the aims and hierarchy of action-motivating foreign policy interests of a given state and on power potentials at its disposal for the attainment for its foreign policy objectives. Generally speaking, power is not regarded by us as a basic human instinct but rather as an often indispensable means of attaining one's interests or self-realization in situations of competing wills.

The fourth category »norm and advantage« deals, on the one side, with the normative legal, ethical or ideological obligations of a state in a given situation and on the other side with competing expectations of advantage or utility

8 Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl: »Neorealismus und Analyse – Zum Ansatz der Münchner Schule«, in: Internationale Politik, No. 8, 1996, pp. 21–28. See also: Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr.: Contending Theories of International Relations. New York 1997, pp. 15, 80–81.

that may tempt and cause that state to violate its own normative codes of conduct if the desired advantages can be obtained only by such violations.⁹

The fifth category »structures and interdependence« aims at an elaboration of circumstances causing for states conditions or networks of economic, technological or political dependence upon external forces beyond unilateral control such as energy supplies for instance, or structures of international configurations, but including also institutionalized alliance or integration commitments or the influence of transnational interactions by non-state actors.

The sixth category »conflict and cooperation« examines the strategies by foreign policy decision-makers in the light of their perceptions of their country's (or system's) national interests and power potentials as compared to the perceived concurrent or conflicting aims and potentials of other powers.

The final operation of a constellation-analysis, called »synopsis«, endeavors to correlate the impact and results of all of those six above mentioned types of inquiry in order obtain an integrated overall picture of the causes and patterns of behavior or interactions of one or of several states < or other action-systems > involved in a given constellation.

Although, as stated before, we regarded our version of Neorealism not as an essential contradiction to but rather as an extension of classical realism, particularly as far as analytical methodology was concerned, I was really worried about Morgenthau's reactions. Feeling greatly indebted to him, I did not want to hurt his feelings or to provoke his anger. Thus I was understandably relieved and – I must say – moved when Morgenthau on December 1st 1976 wrote an introduction to our volume on the Munich School's version of Neorealism, in which he said, among others:

»The only valid test which a methodology of international relations must meet is whether it tells us something about international relations which we would like to know and that is worth knowing. This test is derived from common sense, both intellectually and pragmatically. Philosophically, it is inspired by our perennial curiosity about the existence of man among fellow men. Pragmatically, it respects the limits the contingent nature of the subject-matter imposes upon rational analysis and reliable prognosis.

It is a source of great satisfaction for one who has for a generation worked for the reassertion of these two sources of inspiration that this volume of essays remains faithful to them and uses them as points of departure for new advances in the understanding of international affairs.«¹⁰

9 Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl: » Aussenpolitik im Widerstreit – Spannung zwischen Interesse und Moral.« In: Internationale Politik. No. 9, 1997, pp. 1–6.

10 Translated into German in Kindermann et.al: Grundlelemente der Weltpolitik, o. cit. pp. 49–50.

For us it was thus most encouraging to know that Morgenthau had fully understood that our intention had not been a negation of classical realism but primarily rather to provide it with a diversified methodology and a shift of emphasis as far as certain key concepts were concerned.

The most convincing and objective proof for the continued vitality of Morgenthau's work lies in the fact that it has inspired primarily in America, but to a much lesser degree also in Central Europe, the development of new schools and authors basing their approaches on realist premises. In this respect we are proud to have outstanding young authors such as Christoph Rohde, Christoph Frei, Alexander Siedschlag or Carlo Masala who were invited to this conference and whose major works are on exhibit.¹¹

In conclusion allow me to express my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Kai Schellhorn, our gracious host here in Munich, who enthusiastically responded to my suggestion of convening this conference, since many years ago he had participated in dialogues with Morgenthau and since he is one of the leading authors of our school of Neorealism. Simultaneously my distinguished colleague Professor Christian Hacke of Bonn University, whose masterful works on American and German diplomacy are strongly based on realist concepts, had developed a very similar conference scenario. Thus, greatly supported by the special organizational skills of Mrs. Kerstin Meerwaldt, and the contribu-

11 Outstanding recent European publications on Classical Realism and its consequences do, for instance, include publications such as : Rohde, Christoph: »Hans J. Morgenthau und der Weltpolitische Realismus«, Wiesbaden 2004 (the first comprehensive work on Morgenthau ever written and published in Germany). Frei, Christoph: Hans J. Morgenthau – Eine intellektuelle Biographie. Bern 1993. Siedschlag, Alexander: Neorealismus und Internationale Politik. Opladen 1997. The same author edited and co-authored: Realistische Perspektiven Internationaler Politik. Opladen 2001. Masala, Carlo and Roloff (editors and co-authors): Herausforderungen der Realpolitik. Köln 1998. See also: Meier-Walser, Reinhard C. : »Neorealismus ist mehr als Waltz. Der Synoptische Realismus des Münchner Ansatzes.« In: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen. No. 1 1994, pp. 115–126. The same author published: Die Wissenschaftliche Untersuchung Internationaler Politik. Struktureller Neorealismus, die »Münchner Schule« und das Verfahren der »Internationalen Konstellationsanalyse«. In: Aktuelle Analysen No. 35, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Hanns Seidel Stiftung. München 2004.

In the United States, while G. O. Mazur has edited in 2004 a symposium by outstanding American scholars entitled: One Hundred Year Commemoration to the Life of Hans Morgenthau, it was noted with surprise that the University of Chicago, where Morgenthau had achieved worldwide fame and where he had been teaching for many years, refrained from organizing any appropriate event in commemoration of its scholar whose major work had been translated into three European and three Asian languages and who is internationally regarded as one of the founding fathers of the International Relations discipline.

tions of the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt and the Robert Bosch Foundation, two conference projects were merged into one.

Of course I would like to welcome and to thank each of the distinguished participants personally. Because of the time factor, allow me to do that only with regard to one participant whose origins and presence implies a symbolic connotation. It is Professor Paris Varvaroussis a great Greek scholar from the University of Athens, where I met Hans Morgenthau for a last time in the year before his death. Professor Varvaroussis will deal with the significant impact of classical Greek thought – highly esteemed by Morgenthau – upon his own creation of theory. A revealing information which Morgenthau entrusted to me at that occasion of our last meeting in Athens was that he intended to write a book on the political philosophy of the Biblical prophets. But his early death prevented him from realizing this significant project.